In the harshest criticism of the IDF since the end of the war in Lebanon, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Amiram Levine, former head of the Northern Command, accused Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz in a probe he conducted for the military, of direct responsibility for the IDF's poor performance in its fight against Hizbullah. "The IDF failed in achieving its goals," said Levine.
"The responsibility lies on the shoulders of the chief of staff," Levine concluded in a report he was asked to compile on the performance of the Northern Command during the month-long war this past summer. Levine presented his findings to the General Staff earlier this week. "You erred in your management of forces, based on the principle of giving priority to land forces," Levine told Halutz. One military source called Levine's probe, "the harshest criticism yet of the IDF."
According to Levine's conclusions, Halutz failed when intervening incessantly with tactical decisions in the field and not remaining at General Staff headquarters in Tel Aviv where he should have focused on the strategic planning of the war. Levine also blamed Halutz for not ordering a ground invasion into Lebanon at an earlier stage of the war and accused OC Northern Command at the time of the war Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Udi Adam of not pushing hard enough to obtain approval for such an operation. "The operation plan of the Northern Command failed," Levine concluded in his report. "The battles were dispersed and not concentrated."
Levine also slammed Deputy Chief of Staff Maj.-Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky and Maj.-Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, OC Operations Directorate at the time of the war and now head of the Northern Command, who he said did not try hard enough to influence Halutz's decisions. As infantry soldiers he said, they should have understood the importance of a ground invasion earlier on the in the war.
Prior to last summer’s conflict with Hezbollah, if I were asked to name one single common characteristic of the IDF at war, I would have speculated it would be the extent in which field commanders either ignored or countermanded direct orders from Central Command.
This time, it seems the IDF culture for innovation and daring was lost by the failure of Central Command to stay - well, central. And so, the war’s stated objectives were not met and the deterrence value of the IDF’s reputation was irrevocably harmed.
There is an old military maxim that goes no battle plan survives the first contact with the enemy, and a smart field commander acknowledges the truth of that maxim by keeping his tactical command decisions fluid at all times rather than looking for direction from on high, but realistically, what can one do when Central Command does not understand its place or role?
3 comments:
There was an article in the papers here (Israel) within the last month or so (I'm sorry, I don't remember where), excoriating brigade commanders from the recent war for not staying at the front with their commands.
Throughout its history, the IDF's greatest strength, I think, has not been flexibility, but rather the "Follow me!" style of personal leadership on the field.
I was rejected for service for health reasons, so I won't comment more about the workings of the army.
I'd say that the 'follow me' style has a great deal to do with flexiblity and remaining fluid in the field. Of course, if no commanders are in the field it is kind of hard to "follow".
Sharon, was always one of my favourite generals - I know he was deeply flawed, but I always liked his desire to lead his troops on the field. Mind you, if Sharon was your commander, there was always a good chance you will ended up wounded or dead. Its a style of leadership that in conventional armies is often actively discouraged.
But one doesn't cross the Sinai and capture the Egyptian Third Army by staying put and following orders of Southern Command. Let's face it, the only thing that saved Sharon from a lenghty term in jail was because he was able to deliver - at a high cost, but delivered nonetheless when it was most needed.
I am a fan of the "lead from the front" vs the "lead from the rear" style, but I would hesitate to say whether commanders at the front are automatically more flexible than those that are not. There are certain advantages to being close to the action, but if you put a micro-manager out front he'll be just as detrimental as one in the rear because he can't be all over his AO all the time.
I would rate the commander's trust in his team and delegation ability to be of more importance than his geographic proximity to the fighting. If you have a team you can trust to execute the plan and adapt to changing settings, they can execute that plan whether you are standing next to them or on a satellite link a few thousand miles away. They know that you trust them and they are not afraid to act on their own initiative because you have demonstrated that trust.
If you don't trust their judgment and like to intervene a lot, then you are going to impact their flexibility and morale no matter your location. If all decisions have to be second-guessed by the guy at the top then your whole decision tree bogs down and you can't possibly react fast enough regardless of geography.
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