What allowed Hizbollah to appear successful was its occupation of the bunker-and-tunnel system that it had constructed since June 2000, when the IDF gave up its presence in south Lebanon, which it had occupied since 1982.
Although the IDF had got into south Lebanon, the casualties it had suffered in entering the fortified zone had alarmed the government and high command, since Israel's tiny population is acutely vulnerable to losses in battle. Israel's plan was to destroy Hizbollah's tunnels and bunkers, but the sending of a United Nations intervention force did not allow the destruction to be completed before the IDF was forced to withdraw.
Tunnel systems have played a crucial part in many modern campaigns, without attracting much attention. That is a serious oversight. The success of the Viet Cong in sustaining its war effort in Vietnam in 1968-72 depended heavily on its use of the so-called War Zone B, a complex of deep tunnels and underground bases north of Saigon, which had been begun during the war against the French in 1946-55.
I see it as a foregone conclusion that the war with Hezbollah is merely paused for all the reasons he lists and then some. Earlier this week I saw this Ha’aretz article:
Senior officers Northern Command and Division 91 officers were not privy to essential intelligence information regarding Hezbollah's deployment prior to the second Lebanon War.
The intelligence, which was available to the Israel Defense Forces, included accurate information about Hezbollah bunkers and positions, as well as the internal structure of such positions.
The officers were aware that such information existed, but were prevented by the Intelligence Directorate's Committee on Source Security, claiming that the information was secret. Military Intelligence decided that the information would only be made available in the event of a war.
Officers' demands to gain access to information on routine security preparations that could counter Hezbollah raids inside the border fence were also rejected, and led to repeated and heated arguments among various units.
The information on Hezbollah positions was also withheld from the units during the war itself. Although there was a plan to transfer the data, which was stored in sealed boxes, to relevant units during a war, it was not carried out in time.
When the Israelis withdrew from Lebanon in May 2000 it was an incredibly hurried affair. The IDF was in an uproar and wanted more time but the political echlon was not prepared to wait. Among the many rumors of what the Israelis left behind to fall into Hezbollah’s hands were a series of underground bunkers and tunnels left in tact.
These tunnels and bunker positions could well be the backbone to the system Hezbollah has created in southern Lebanon. Not only would it be ironic but it offers the only plausible explaination on why this intelligence information on potential Hezbollah positions and bunkers was delayed by the IDF’s military intelligence unit.
Another oddity of the first round of the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict was the lack of call of up of reserve and former reserve officers who spent their military careers fighting in Lebanon. Twenty years experience and knowledge of terrain is not a triffle to refuse to utilize and it flies in the face of Israel’s historical mililtary ethos. I imagine the Yom Kippur Sinai campaign would have gone very differently if Sharon was not called out of retirement to assume a southern divisional commander post.
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